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The American Poetry Wax Museum: Reality Effects, 1940-1990. By Jed 
Rasula. Urbana: NCTE P, 1995.
Rasula presents a “documentary and polemic” aimed at revealing how “can­
onizing assumptions (and compulsions)” have flattened the field of American 
poetry and narrowed its goals to the “enshrinement of the self-expressive 
subject” (4). The operations of publishers, the academy, and movements 
within poetry itself work together to comodify aesthetic experience and to 
create a poetic monoculture; these operations are justified by appeals to a 
nonexistent “general reader.” Rasula claims that these institutions thus func­
tion as what Tony Bennett would call in his study of museum systems an 
“exhibitionary complex,” with the exception that this complex has a fascina­
tion for what Rasula calls “the return of the expressed,” the repetition of fa­
miliar forms and themes that provides, quoting from Adorno’s Aesthetic 
Theory “ the illusion of intelligibility” (12, 10). Rasula therefore dubs this 
complex The American Poetry Wax Museum. The polemical content of 
Rasula’s book can therefore be summarized as saying that these organiza­
tions, willy nilly, practice a politics of the center, the beneficiary of which is 
“the solitary white male” (415).
The documentary portion of Rasula’s work relies upon an analysis 
of the apotheosis of New Criticism and its “antithetical” “emphasis on for­
malism, Christianity, and regionalism” as well as of the controversy sur­
rounding the nomination of Pound for the Bollingen Prize in 1948, to argue 
that the rise of a “sociological” attitude toward literature in the 1950s was an 
outgrowth of a new “managerial temperament” which transformed American 
poetry in the ensuing decades into a series of cults of personality centered 
around Auden, then Lowell, and finally culminating in a conflict between the 
raw poetry of the Beats and the cooked poetry of the New Formalists (85, 
122). Rasula concludes that the “[American] poetry world is now configured 
by four zones” which are “[u]tterly disproportionate in terms of size, material 
resources, and internal stability”: the Associated Writing Programs, the New 
Formalists, the language poets, and various groups of identity-based poetic 
communities (440). These four “zones” are presented as outgrowths of a 
single interest—what to do with the rupture initiated by Modernism—that 
can be localized in two intentions: to either close this rupture by emphasizing 
craft and form or to expand it by emphasizing poetics, which in turn encloses 
“method, polemic, religious dicta, and social critique” (441).
Rasula begins his conclusion by proposing a new word, 
canontology, that “has to do with sanctioned prescriptions for . . . styles o f 
belonging” and by claiming that both Confessional Poets and the Beats, 
though lying on opposite sides of the formalism/poetics dispute, tended to 
court canontology (471). Finally, Rasula claims that what is lost in such dis­
putes is “the audacity of Whitman’s attempt to make a canon all by himself, 
sensing in the center cause for bereavement” and reminds his reader that, 
quoting Williams, “[t]he local is the only thing that is universal” (483). The
83
American Poetry Wax Museum's application of Bennett’s exhibitionary com­
plex is a useful companion and corrective to monolithic works like David 
Perkins’s two-volume A History o f Modern Poetry and it is a clear statement 
of some of the aesthetic and political concerns informing the works of such 
poets as Susan Howe, Charles Bernstein, and Nathaniel Mackey.
J. P. Craig
Wittgenstein’s Ladder: Poetic Language and the Strangeness o f the Ordinary. 
Perloff, Marjorie. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1996.
Perloff’s Wittgenstein’s Ladder explores the ladder metaphor in 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (postulate #6.54)—
My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who under­
stands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he 
has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He 
must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has 
climbed up on it.)
—  as the basis of a “distinctively Wittgensteinian poetics” whose character­
istics include an emphasis on linguistic “dailyness,” a suspicion of “theory it­
self as an imposition on practice,” and a belief in iterative “difference” in 
which “[repetition . . . always entails a shift in context as well as in use” 
(xiv). Perloff claims that passages in Wittgenstein’s notebooks and other 
writings that appear tautologous, like “The world of the happy is a happy 
world,” amount to a “foregrounding of syntactic difference [that] is closer to 
avant-garde writing than to the style of [Russell’s] The Principia 
Mathematical’ (44). Instead the “sudden break, the lack of connection, be­
tween two kinds of operation” constitutes a “uniquely Wittgensteinian” writ­
ing practice that contains a “note of irresolution” which belies the claims of 
those like Adorno who see Wittgenstein’s famous aphorism—“Whereof one 
cannot speak, thereof one must be silent”—as little more than a “gesture of 
reverent authoritarian authenticity” (12). Perloff claims that this is instead a 
“commonsense recognition that there are metaphysical and ethical aporias 
that no discussion . . . can fully rationalize” (12). She later links the appari­
tion of these aporias in Wittgenstein’s writing practices to the dailyness men­
tioned above through Victor Shklovsky’s notion of defamiliarization:
Wittgenstein’s ordinary is best understood as quite simply 
that which is, the language we do actually use when we 
communicate with one another. In this sense, the ordinary 
need not be literal, denotative, propositional, neutral, refer­
ential . . . .  On the contrary, our actual language may well 
be connotative, metaphoric, fantastic, the issue being quite
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